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By the Pricking of My Thumbs, State Restriction This
Way Comes: Immunizing Vaccination Laws from
Constitutional Review
INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, Disneyland in California was far from the happiest
place on earth: an outbreak of measles began,1 lasting until April 17, 2015,
and infecting at least 147 people.2 The outbreak was blamed on an
insufficient number of vaccinated children, and it also infected many
children, some of whom were infants too young to be fully vaccinated
against the measles.3 From January 1, 2015 to September 18, 2015,4 the
total number of reported measles cases in the United States was 189,
covering 24 states and the District of Columbia.5
Outbreaks6 such as the Disneyland incident represent an alarming
trend in recent years. In 2014, the United States had a record number of
measles outbreaks, with 27 states reporting a total of 668 cases.7 This
number shattered the record since the declaration of the elimination of

Copyright 2016, by MEGAN JOY RIALS.
1. Amy Taxin, 9 Measles Cases Linked to Disney Theme Parks in California,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 7, 2015, 3:19 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/life/travel
/9-measles-cases-linked-to-disney-theme-parks-in-california/ [http://perma.cc/G7QQ
-6VMP].
2. Alicia Chang, Large Measles Outbreak Traced to Disneyland is Declared
Over, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/large
-measles-outbreak-traced-disneyland-declared-over-162831457.html [https://per
ma.cc/VE2M-B4RM].
3. Id.; Karen Kaplan, Vaccine Refusal Helped Fuel Disneyland Measles
Outbreak, Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-disneyland-measles-under-vaccination-20150
316-story.html [https://perma.cc/WM4R-SY84].
4. See Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html [https://perma.cc/S
DB8-4CP6 ] (last updated July 20, 2016).
5. Measles, NAT’L FOUND. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.nfid.org
/idinfo/measles (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
6. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) defines an
“outbreak” as three or more cases that are connected by time or geographic location.
Ctr. For Disease Control and Prevention, Measles—United States, 2011, 61
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Apr. 20, 2012, at 253, http://www
.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm6115.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXB7-LX6C].
7. See Measles Cases and Outbreaks, supra note 4.
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measles in 2000.8 In 2013, the U.S. experienced 11 outbreaks of measles,
with one large outbreak affecting unvaccinated Amish communities in
Ohio. 9 The total number of cases in 2013 was at least 175.10 In 2011, 17
outbreaks and 22 measles cases were reported, at the time marking the
highest number of measles cases in a given year since 1996.11 The Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) reports that most victims are
unvaccinated and that the disease spreads through unvaccinated groups.12
Thus, high vaccination rates are vital to prevent the spread of diseases.13
To ensure high vaccination rates, all 50 states have mandatory
vaccination laws requiring their citizens to be vaccinated.14 Three types of
exemptions from mandatory state vaccination laws exist: medical,
philosophical, and religious exemptions.15 Although medical exemptions
are not controversial, philosophical and religious exemptions are, not only
because of the possible threat the exemptions could create by lowering
vaccination rates,16 but also because unlike medical exemptions, they are
based on parental beliefs rather than the child’s medical condition. The
Supreme Court has never heard a case involving exemptions to state
vaccination laws and has heard only two cases involving vaccination laws
in general: Jacobson v. Massachusetts17 and Zucht v. King.18 Together
8. Id.
9. Id.; Measles Still Threatens Health Security, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (Dec. 5, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases
/2013/p1205-meales-threat.html [https://perma.cc/7K4H-LM3Q].
10. Measles Cases and Outbreaks, supra note 4; Measles Still Threatens Health
Security, supra note 9.
11. Measles—United States, 2011, supra note 6; Mike Stobbe, CDC: 2011 Was
Worst Measles Year in U.S. in 15 Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 19, 2012, 4:06
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/story/2012-04-19/Measles-worstyear-CDC/54411802/1 [https://perma.cc/42DF-LMJG].
12. Measles Cases and Outbreaks, supra note 4. In 2013, 11 outbreaks of
measles occurred. Three of these outbreaks included more than 20 cases, and one
included 58 cases. Id.
13. Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public
Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE
262, 264 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
14. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/research
/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HZZ-B3
B2] (last updated Jan. 21, 2016).
15. Id.
16. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 265.
17. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
18. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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these cases held that states have the police power to mandate vaccinations
and make them a prerequisite for attending school.19 Since Zucht in 1922,20
however, the Supreme Court has developed a line of jurisprudence that
recognizes parental rights as constitutionally protected.21 These parental
rights holdings conflict with the previous holdings of the Court’s
vaccination cases in Jacobson and Zucht because state laws forcing
parents to vaccinate their children over parental objections could violate
the parents’ constitutional rights.
This Comment argues that states should not allow philosophical
exemptions and should either retain or create religious exemptions that
meet certain requirements under the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the Establishment Clause. California and Louisiana differ in
their approaches to vaccination laws. As a result of the California
legislature’s controversial response to the Disneyland measles outbreak by
banning philosophical and religious exemptions,22 California is now
among the few states with the strictest vaccination requirements.23 In
contrast, Louisiana is among the states with the laxest vaccination laws,
which allow for both exemptions.24 Under the proposed solution,
California should modify its law to allow religious exemptions, and
Louisiana should ban philosophical exemptions.
Part I of this Comment details the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
regarding parental rights. It explains how the protection that these cases
afford to parental rights under the Due Process Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause could provide a framework different from Jacobson and Zucht
through which to view state vaccination laws. It also gives a brief history of
the invention of vaccinations and explains the necessity of maintaining high
vaccination rates, in addition to discussing the three types of exemptions.
Part II analyzes the scarce Supreme Court jurisprudence on state vaccination
laws. It also explains the controversy surrounding California Senate Bill
277, which California’s legislature enacted in response to the Disneyland
measles outbreak, and compares California law to Louisiana law. Part III
19. Id. at 176; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36–37.
20. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176.
21. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
22. Adam Nagourney, California Mandates Vaccines for Schoolchildren,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/californiamandates-vaccines-for-schoolchildren.html [https://perma.cc/Z9XU-GYCT].
23. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14.
24. Id.
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details the different approaches lower courts have taken when analyzing
exemptions, with an eye toward the solution of banning philosophical
exemptions while allowing religious exemptions. Part IV proposes the
solution of banning philosophical exemptions and allowing religious
exemptions as a policy matter and suggests a change in the wording of
state vaccination legislation to meet Free Exercise, Due Process, and
Establishment Clause requirements.
I. ALL OUR YESTERDAYS: PARENTAL RIGHTS V. VACCINATION LAWS
The state has an interest in vaccinating its citizens to safeguard them
from diseases; these disease control efforts, however, might conflict with
the freedom of parents to raise their children as they wish. Whether the
issue is considered a parental rights or a states’ rights issue controls the
answer to the questions surrounding exemptions to state vaccination laws.
The Supreme Court has heard cases regarding parental authority that are
wholly separate from cases involving vaccination laws. The cases the
Court has heard regarding vaccinations held that the state has the power to
mandate vaccination laws.25 Parental rights cases, however, have generally
held that parental authority is protected under the Due Process Clause and
sometimes the Free Exercise Clause from the states’ attempts to interfere
with parental decisions regarding how children are raised.26 An analysis of
exemptions to state vaccination laws under parental rights case law
changes the discussion from one of states’ rights to enact laws to protect
the public from disease to one of parents’ rights to raise their children as
they deem fit.27
A. Constitutional Protection of Parental Rights
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of parental rights. The protections afforded to parental rights
fall into two categories: Due Process protections and Free Exercise
protections.28 The Court has upheld parental rights in these cases, even
over the state’s interest in educating its citizens and claims of visitation
25. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 36–37
(1905).
26. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
27. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
28. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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rights. Moreover, when parental decisions are based on religion, the Court
takes particular note of the rights parents possess to raise their children in
the religion they wish, even if the decision conflicts with a state law.29
1. Due Process Protections
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
citizens will not be denied fundamental rights without due process of
law.30 Although the Due Process Clause does not explicitly acknowledge
parental rights, the Supreme Court has recognized that parental rights are
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court struck down a law that limited
parents’ rights to educate their children in speaking a foreign language
under the Due Process Clause.32 Despite the absence of parental rights in
the Constitution, the Court recognized the right “to marry, establish a
home and bring up children” as protected under the Due Process Clause.33
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that a law
requiring children to attend public schools violated the Due Process Clause
because it interfered with parents’ rights to raise their children as they
wished.34 The Court reasoned, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State,”35 thereby recognizing that states generally cannot interfere with
parents’ decisions to raise their children as they wish.
In the more recent case of Troxel v. Granville, the Court overturned a
law that allowed the courts to override parental decisions as to what their
children’s best interests were with regard to the visitation rights of
nonparents—in this case, grandparents.36 In its holding, the Court
recognized its extensive jurisprudence upholding parental rights, stating,
“[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the
29. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (refusing to dictate parents’ educational
decisions when the education interfered with the children’s religious upbringing,
and noting that to decide otherwise would be the Court deciding the children’s
religious future).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
31. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–
35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
32. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97, 399, 403.
33. Id. at 399.
34. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530, 534–35.
35. Id. at 535.
36. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children.”37 Thus, under Troxel, parents possess the exclusive right
not only to raise their children as they wish, but also to make decisions for
their children’s well-being.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has firmly established parental rights
as protected by the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, these holdings show
that the Supreme Court will uphold parental rights even under claims that
the parent’s decision is not in the child’s best interest.
2. Free Exercise Clause Protections
In addition to recognizing parental rights under the Due Process
Clause, the Court has also defended parental rights under the Free Exercise
Clause, which prohibits the government from barring the free exercise of
religion.38 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, two Amish families challenged a law
mandating school attendance until the age of 16 on the grounds that it
violated the principles of the Amish religion.39 The families argued that
school attendance at this time in the children’s lives significantly
interfered with Amish religious training because the two occurred at the
same time.40 The Court declared the application of the law to the Amish
families unconstitutional and explained that giving the state this much
power under parens patriae41 would be tantamount to deciding the child’s
“religious future.”42 The Court rejected the claim that the state should
rescue Amish children from their parents’ religious beliefs, stating that the
case implicated the “fundamental interest of parents . . . to guide the
religious future and education of their children,” and that parents’ rights
to raise their children as they wish were “now established beyond
debate.”43 Thus, under Yoder, parents possess the fundamental right to
educate and raise their children in the religion of the parents’ choosing.
The Court also indirectly addressed parental rights in a case that on its
face seemed to have no relation to the issue. In Employment Division of
37. Id. at 66.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion].”).
39. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972).
40. Id. at 222.
41. Id. at 232. The term parens patriae is literally translated as “parent of his
or her country” and refers to the state’s ability to protect citizens who cannot
protect themselves. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
42. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
43. Id.
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Oregon v. Smith, the defendants had ingested peyote, which Oregon’s
criminal law considered a “controlled substance,” as part of a Native
American religious sacrament.44 The Court rejected the defendants’
argument that their religious beliefs should decriminalize their conduct
under the relevant statute, stating, “[w]e have never held that an
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”45
The primary effect of Smith is that laws burdening religion are permissible
and not subject to the compelling interest test46 as long as they are
generally applicable and not targeted at that religion.47
Although the case did not involve parental rights, in dicta, the Court
turned to the protection of parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause.48
It noted that the compelling interest test still applied to laws restricting the
free exercise of religion when the religious activity was connected to other
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to raise
children under Pierce and Yoder.49 Thus, the Court explicitly recognized
that parental rights connected with freedom of religion receive extensive
protection under the Constitution.
The Court refused to mandate that states create sweeping religious
exemptions to their laws as a whole and included vaccination laws in its
listing of generally applicable state laws.50 It observed, however, that the
states themselves are free to create nondiscriminatory religious
exemptions to their laws.51 It also noted that religious exemptions can be
“desirable,” although these exemptions are not constitutionally required,
nor immune from judicial review.52 Although exemptions to state
vaccination laws might not be constitutionally mandated, the Court

44. Emp’t Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
45. Id. at 878–79.
46. The compelling interest test comes from Sherbert v. Verner and first
requires the court to determine whether “any burden” exists on the individual’s
free exercise of religion as a result of the law. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963). If a burden exists, the law burdening the free exercise of religion can
be justified only if the state shows a “compelling interest”—that is, a serious
interest—justifying the law and that the state has no other avenue to further its
interest. Id. at 406–07.
47. Emp’t Div. of Or., 494 U.S. at 885.
48. Id. at 881.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 888–90.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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recognized the importance of religious exemptions with regard to all state
laws, and specifically vaccination laws.
B. Vaccination History, Laws, and Exemptions
Vaccinations play an important role in maintaining public health, but
state-mandated vaccinations have the potential to conflict with parents’
religious beliefs and concerns over safety and health. Three types of
exemptions exist that allow parents to opt out of vaccinating their children
in accordance with these beliefs and concerns. Because vaccinations are
vital to maintaining disease eradication, the state has a high interest in
ensuring that its citizens are vaccinated.
1. History of Vaccinations and Herd Immunity
The state’s interest in maintaining high vaccination rates to keep
citizens healthy traces back to 1796, when Edward Jenner invented the
smallpox vaccine.53 Vaccines were a medical breakthrough, and their use
quickly spread throughout Europe and the United States.54 In 1809,
Massachusetts became the first state to mandate vaccinations, and in 1855,
became the first state to mandate childhood vaccinations as a prerequisite
for attending school.55 The CDC now counts vaccinations as one of the top
ten public health achievements of the 20th century.56
One of the primary medical reasons responsible for this achievement is
that vaccinations rely on what is known as “herd immunity” to sustain
disease eradication.57 Herd immunity is the phenomenon that occurs once a
high percentage of the population is vaccinated.58 Vaccinated persons serve
as a “barrier” to the few who are not vaccinated and prevent the spread of
diseases that are transmitted individually.59 Although 100% of the
population is not required to be vaccinated, once a high enough percentage

53. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 262.
54. Donald H. Henderson, Edward Jenner’s Vaccine, 112 PUB. HEALTH
REPS. 116, 117 (1997).
55. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 271.
56. Ctr. For Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health
Achievements—United States, 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP., Apr. 2, 1999, at 241, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm48
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD53-VKWY].
57. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 264.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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is vaccinated, herd immunity confers the benefits of disease protection to
the entire population.60
Because those who are unvaccinated profit from vaccinations while
avoiding the perceived risks of vaccinations, the practice of being
unvaccinated is incentivized.61 This attitude threatens the existence of herd
immunity; once the percentage of vaccinated persons drops sufficiently,
herd immunity is destroyed.62 The potential for outbreaks increases with
high concentrations of unvaccinated persons.63 Unvaccinated persons can
endanger infants too young to be vaccinated, the elderly, and those with
compromised immune systems, such as cancer patients, by exposing them
to diseases preventable by vaccines.64
One study confirmed that geographically concentrated groups with
high rates of unvaccinated children pose a risk of transmitting diseases to
the vaccinated population, specifically, to those for whom vaccinations
were not effective for some reason.65 Additionally, unvaccinated children
have a risk of contracting measles 35 times higher than do vaccinated
children.66 Despite this data, California has reported a particularly high
rate of “exemptors”—that is, parents who opt out of vaccinating their
children—who were generally clustered in the same geographic regions,

60. Id. (explaining that the percentage that is required to be vaccinated varies
depending on the disease; for measles, the required percentage exceeds 90%).
61. Id. at 263–65. See infra Part I.B.2.b. for a discussion of the belief that
vaccines cause autism and for an explanation of why it is one of the main
objections parents have to vaccines and one of the perceived risks parents believe
they avoid by not vaccinating their children.
62. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 265. A recent study using data from
2013 found that the percentage of vaccinated children has dipped below the optimal
rate of 90% for the MMR vaccine—that is, the mumps, measles, and rubella
vaccine—with 17 states reporting that fewer than 90% of children from the ages of 19
months to 39 months had not received the MMR vaccine. Measles Vaccination Rates
for Preschoolers Below 90 Percent in 17 States, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH (Feb.
4, 2015), http://healthyamericans.org/newsroom/releases/?releaseid=323 [https://per
ma.cc/W5P6-4VZQ].
63. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 269–70.
64. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 420–21
(2004).
65. Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and
Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization Laws, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 47,
51 (1999).
66. Id.
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with 16% of schools reporting higher than average percentages of
unvaccinated kindergarteners.67
Exemptors do not pose a serious threat to the rest of the vaccinated
population, but only if exemption rates remain low and vaccination rates
remain high.68 Thus, the policy interest of the state in maintaining a healthy
community through herd immunity could be jeopardized if too many parents
claim exemptions to vaccination laws. All 50 states have mandatory
vaccination laws for children as a requirement for school attendance,69 but
exemptions to these vaccination laws have been blamed for lowering rates
of vaccinations.70
2. Objections to Vaccines: Three Types of Exemptions
Three types of exemptions from vaccination requirements are recognized:
medical, philosophical—also called personal—and religious exemptions.71
States vary with regard to the level of proof required to grant exemptions, and
one study found that the laxer a state is in requiring proof of reasons for
objections, whether religious or philosophical, the higher the number of
unvaccinated children in that state.72 States that required a form signed by a
parent or guardian, a letter from a parent, or a notarized signature—in that
order of complexity—had lower rates of exemptions, whereas states with
lower standards of proof had higher rates of exemptions.73 In other words,
the higher the rate of complexity in the process of applying for exemptions,
the lower the rate of actual exemptions, and the lower the rate of
complexity, the higher the rate of exemptions. California, Mississippi, and
West Virginia have the strictest vaccination laws in the U.S. because they

67. Id. at 49.
68. Id. at 51.
69. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14.
70. Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions
to State Immunization Laws, 91 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 645, 647 (2001).
71. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14.
72. Rota et al., supra note 70, at 647.
73. Id. at 646–47. The study also explained that for the second level of
complexity, the letter requirement, the study also included states that required
parents to obtain a form from a local health department. Id. at 646. The third and
highest level of complexity included states that required both a letter and a form
obtained from a local health department. Id. Some of those states also required a
letter from a religious official or a signature of a state official. Id.
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recognize neither philosophical nor religious exemptions.74 In contrast,
Louisiana is among the states with the laxest requirements because it
grants medical, philosophical, and religious exemptions.75
a. Medical Exemptions
Medical exemptions are consistent with the state’s policy interest of
keeping its citizens healthy. All 50 states recognize medical exemptions,76
and they are not controversial. Children who suffer from cancer, whose
immune systems have been compromised, or who are allergic to vaccines
receive these exemptions upon certification from their doctors.77 Forcing
children who would be harmed by vaccinations to receive them would
violate the state’s policy interest of ensuring that its citizens are healthy,
and thus these exemptions are fully justified.
b. Philosophical Exemptions
In contrast to medical exemptions, which require a preexisting medical
condition for the child to qualify, philosophical exemptions78 are often based
on “‘personal,’ ‘moral,’ or ‘other’ beliefs,” or, more simply, the parents’
beliefs.79 These laws typically require that the beliefs be sincerely held or
exercised in good faith,80 although states rarely, if ever, enforce these
requirements.81
A prime example of a philosophical objection to vaccinations is the
widely held belief that vaccinations cause autism. In 1998, Dr. Andrew
74. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:170 (2016); Daniel A. Salmon & Andrew
W. Siegel, Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Vaccination
Requirements and Lessons Learned from Conscientious Objectors from
Conscription, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 289, 290 (2001).
78. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14 (noting that as a result of recent
legislation from California and Vermont banning philosophical exemptions, the
number of states that allow philosophical exemptions is 18).
79. James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 874 (2001).
80. Id. at 873.
81. Alan R. Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws that Work, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 122, 125 (2002) (noting that 32 of 48 states that have religious or
philosophical exemptions have not denied even one application).
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Wakefield and 11 other doctors published a medical study claiming a link
between autism and the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine, also known
as the MMR vaccine.82 In response, alarmed parents refused to vaccinate
their children for fear of triggering autism.83 Consequently, vaccination
rates in the U.S. have decreased significantly.84 Despite the retraction of
the article85 and the denial from the scientific community of any link
between autism and vaccinations,86 parents continue to object to
vaccinating their children on this ground.87
c. Religious Exemptions
Similar to the requirements for philosophical exemptions, religious
exemptions88 require that parents hold certain beliefs. In contrast to
philosophical exemptions, however, the reason for objecting must be
82. A. J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-Specific
Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 LANCET 637, 639–
40 (1998).
83. Lenisa Chang, The MMR-Autism Controversy: Did Autism Concerns Affect
Vaccine Take Up? (November 8, 2012) (unpublished abstract), https://appam.con
fex.com/appam/2012/webprogram/Paper3943.html [https://perma.cc/Z2P7-Z8U5]
(finding that vaccination rates decreased by 2% from 1999 to 2000 following
publication of Wakefield’s article and continued to decline in subsequent years).
84. Id.
85. Simon H. Murch, et al., Retraction—Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia,
Non-Specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 375
LANCET 445, 445 (2010).
86. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, ADVERSE EFFECTS OF VACCINES:
EVIDENCE AND CAUSALITY 145, 545 (Kathleen Stratton et al., eds., 2011) (finding that
the evidence favored a rejection of a link between vaccines and autism).
87. Gary L. Freed et al., Parental Vaccine Safety Concerns in 2009, 125
PEDIATRICS 654, 657 (2010), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early
/2010/03/01/peds.2009-1962.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/S53F-AKZL] (finding
that over one in five parents believe there is a link between vaccinations and autism).
Another study conducted in 2013 found that 33% of parents with minor children
continue to believe that vaccinations cause autism. Of the 50% of parents who were
aware of the study linking vaccinations to autism, only 50% were also aware that the
study has been discredited and retracted. Survey: One Third of American Parents
Mistakenly Link Vaccines to Autism, NAT’L CONSUMERS LEAGUE (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.nclnet.org/survey_one_third_of_american_parents_mistakenly_link_vac
cines_to_autism [https://perma.cc/RY8U-TALL].
88. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14 (noting that on July 1, 2016, California
joined Mississippi and West Virginia as the only states not to recognize religious
exemptions).
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based on religious rather than secular grounds.89 The majority view90 is
that parents who possess a “sincerely held religious belief” against
vaccinations must be granted religious exemptions under vaccination laws
that allow them.91 Religious groups who receive these exemptions, such
as the Amish, Christian Scientists, and Mennonites, have experienced
major outbreaks of diseases that those vaccines were designed to target.92
Religious groups that opt out of vaccinations pose a lesser threat to the rest
of the population, however, because they are few in number and
geographically concentrated.93
II. ITS HOUR UPON THE STAGE: VACCINATION CASES
AND CONTROVERSIES
Despite the important issues that vaccination laws and exemptions raise,
the Supreme Court has heard only two vaccination cases that implicate
mandatory state vaccination laws, Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Zucht v.
King.94 The more recent case, Zucht, is from 1922.95 Additionally, the cases
do not address either philosophical or religious exemptions. Thus, this dated
precedent fails to include any consideration of exemptions or of the
constitutional rights that the Court has since afforded to parents. Although
the Court’s previous precedent affirmed states’ police power to mandate
vaccination laws,96 the Court could decide differently today.
A. Supreme Court Vaccination Cases
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court confirmed that states
possess the police power to set their own laws governing vaccinations of
their citizens.97 Jacobson had objected to being vaccinated against smallpox
89. See Mason v. General Brown Ctr. Sch. Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 5051 (2d Cir.
1988).
90. Calandrillo, supra note 64, at 415.
91. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F.
Supp. 81, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
92. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Worship Optional: Joining a Church To Avoid
Vaccines, N.Y. T IMES (Jan. 14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14
/science/worship-optional-joining-a-church-to-avoid-vaccines.html?pagewanted=1
[https://perma.cc/EAR4-UV7K].
93. Id.
94. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
95. Zucht, 260 U.S. 174.
96. Id. at 176; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
97. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
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because he claimed that the vaccine presented a risk of death, that as a child
he had experienced an adverse reaction to a vaccine, and that he had observed
a similar reaction in his own son.98 He argued that the state law mandating
vaccinations was “unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive” and that forced
vaccinations were tantamount to personal assaults.99 In rejecting his claims
and upholding Massachusetts’s mandatory vaccination law, the Court stated
that it was “unwilling” to hold that “one person, or a minority of persons,
residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local government,
should have the power thus to dominate the majority when supported in their
action by the authority of the State.”100 Therefore, the Court has recognized
that in the context of vaccinations, the state has the police power to override a
minority viewpoint.
The Supreme Court expanded this reasoning 17 years later in Zucht v.
King.101 In San Antonio, Texas, a couple refused to vaccinate their child in
accordance with state ordinances on the grounds that the compulsory
vaccination requirement deprived the child of her liberty without due process
of law.102 The Court held that mandating vaccinations for all children as a
condition of attending school was constitutional and fell within the state’s
police power.103 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed states’ rights to impose
their own requirements regarding vaccinations.
B. State Laws
Since the Supreme Court has held that states have the power to impose
requirements regarding vaccinations,104 the states have taken seriously the
right to create their own exemptions. The states possess a wide array of
vaccination laws: some allow medical, philosophical, and religious
exemptions; some allow only medical exemptions; and others recognize
only medical and religious exemptions.105 As a result of recent legislation,
98. Id. at 36. Jacobson’s objections are similar to those claimed under current
philosophical exemptions, particularly those claims that link vaccines to autism,
because they express concerns over the safety of vaccines. The Court, however,
did not label his claims as such or refer to medical, philosophical, or religious
exemptions at all.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 38.
101. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176.
102. Id. at 175.
103. Id. at 176.
104. Id.; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
105. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization
Requirements, supra note 14.
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California is now among only three states that have the strictest
vaccination laws in the nation.106
1. History and Content of California SB277
In response to the measles outbreak at Disneyland in 2014, the California
legislature passed Senate Bill 277, which does not allow parents to opt out of
vaccinating their children for philosophical or religious reasons unless they
choose to homeschool.107 The bill radically alters California’s existing law
because the state previously allowed both philosophical and religious
exemptions.108 Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill, CA SB277, into law on
June 30, 2015,109 and the law took effect on July 1, 2016.110 Opposition arose
quickly, with groups suing to stop the law’s enforcement almost immediately
after the law took effect.111 A central objection to state-mandated vaccinations
is that the government is exercising extensive control over parents’ rights to
choose what they believe is best for their children.112
2. Louisiana Vaccination Laws
Were they to move to Louisiana, California parents would face none
of these concerns for three reasons. First, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 17:170(E) allows medical, religious, and personal exemptions
from vaccinations.113 Second, Louisiana Children’s Code article 101
specifically provides that parents can make their own choices regarding
their children’s medical health.114 This provision has apparently not been
controversial enough to generate a discussion of the scope of the article:
106. Id.
107. Nagourney, supra note 22.
108. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, supra note 14.
109. Nagourney, supra note 22.
110. 2015 Cal. Stat. 1438 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE D. 105, Pt. 2, Ch. 1).
111. Lawsuit Challenges California’s New Vaccine Requirements, CBS L.A. (Jul.
5, 2016, 6:32 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/07/05/lawsuit-challengescalifornias-new-vaccine-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/U3WY-A92W].
112. Sharon Bernstein, Bid to Repeal California School Vaccination Law May
Falter, REUTERS, (Sept. 30, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015
/09/30/us-usa-california-vaccines-idUSKCN0RU32N20150930 [https://perma.cc/LT
7Z-B2HY] (noting that concerns have ranged from parents’ fears that vaccinations
cause autism to objections over the lack of a religious exemption).
113. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:170(E) (2016).
114. LA. CHILD. CODE ART. 101 (2016).
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no Louisiana cases applying the provision exist as of the writing of this
Comment. Third, Louisiana has enacted the Preservation of Religious
Freedom Act.115 It declares religion a “fundamental right of the highest order
in this state.”116 California does not possess an equivalent of Louisiana’s
religious freedom act.117 Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act
might mean that Louisiana could not eliminate its religious exemption to its
vaccination laws without violating the Act. On the other hand, because
California does not have a state religious freedom act, it might not suffer any
adverse legal consequences by eliminating its religious exemption.
III. SOUND AND FURY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
OBJECTIONS TO VACCINATION LAWS
The two main controversies surrounding vaccination laws and
exemptions involve philosophical objections and religious objections.118
Parents who object to vaccination laws on philosophical grounds alone,
however, might lose their case. A potentially more successful argument is
that state-mandated vaccination laws infringe on parental rights regarding
the raising of children under the more recent Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the Due Process Clause. Parents might also argue that they
should be recognized as conscientious objectors—that is, those who are
opposed to a duty required by law—an argument typically used in the
context of conscription into the military.119 A constitutional analysis
reveals that states are not required to have philosophical exemptions under
either the Due Process Clause or the conscientious objector doctrine of the
First Amendment. Similarly, jurisprudence shows that religious
exemptions to state vaccination laws are constitutional.120 As with
philosophical exemptions, religious exemptions are not required under the
Due Process Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Because states are not
forbidden to have philosophical or religious exemptions but instead are
free to create exemptions as they wish, a policy analysis is needed to
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231 (2016).
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5232 (2016); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEG.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UPT3-6G2E] (last updated Oct. 15, 2015).
118. See Lea Ann Fracasso, Developing Immunity: The Challenges in
Mandating Vaccinations in the Wake of a Biological Terrorist Attack, 13 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 4 (2010).
119. Conscientious Objector, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
120. See infra Part III.B.1 for a full discussion of the constitutionality of
religious exemptions.
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resolve the question of whether states should have philosophical and
religious exemptions.
A. Philosophical Objections
Philosophical exemptions can be based on almost any reason the
parent has for objecting to vaccinations and can therefore vary widely.121
One philosophical objection to vaccinations is the widespread belief
among parents that vaccinations cause autism.122 This objection is now
based on discredited science,123 which could pose a serious roadblock for
parents who wish to opt out of vaccinating their children for this reason.
Additionally, under Jacobson and Zucht, the states clearly possess the
police power to enforce their vaccination requirements.124 Parents would
need to rely on constitutional arguments to convince states to create or
retain a philosophical exemption.
1. Parental Due Process Rights Do Not Require Philosophical
Exemptions
Parents opposing vaccinations for philosophical reasons could make a
compelling argument that under the more recent line of Supreme Court
parental rights cases, parents must be allowed to refuse vaccinations based
on philosophical reasons. Certainly, the trifecta of Meyer, Pierce, and
Troxel all plainly state the Court’s holdings that parents are allowed to
make their own decisions regarding the raising of their children and that
the Due Process Clause protects parental rights.125 Parents might also rely
on the Court’s language that raising a family is “of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.”126 The
Supreme Court’s decision in Parham v. J.R.127 also could be used to
support this argument. In Parham, the Court upheld a law allowing parents
121. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 79, at 874.
122. See, e.g., Freed et al., supra note 87 (finding that over one in five parents
believes there is a link between vaccinations and autism).
123. Murch, et al., supra note 85; ADVERSE EFFECTS OF VACCINES, supra note
86 (finding that the evidence favored a rejection of a link between vaccines and
autism).
124. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905); Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174, 176 (1922).
125. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
126. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965).
127. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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to commit their children to hospitals for treatment of mental illnesses,
reasoning that parents possess the knowledge necessary to make decisions
for their young children.128 The Court thereby recognized that parents have
the right to make decisions for their children’s medical treatment.129
As one court noted, however, philosophical beliefs are traditionally
not afforded the same high level of protection that religious beliefs
receive.130 Religious claims are afforded more protection under the
Constitution than personal or philosophical claims, even when these
groups have identical underlying values.131 Furthermore, although more
recent than Jacobson and Zucht, the decisions of Meyer, Pierce, and
Troxel support parental rights but do not address vaccinations.132 Jacobson
and Zucht are more controlling because they specifically address the issue
of vaccinations and recognize state police power to set vaccination laws.133
Additionally, the case law could be interpreted as having already
addressed an argument in favor of constitutionally required philosophical
exemptions. In Jacobson, the father’s belief that vaccines had adverse
results134 should be viewed as akin to, if not identical to, current objections
that vaccines cause autism. In addressing the father’s concern, the Court
stated that a minority view could not take precedence over the majority
and endanger public health.135 The Parham Court added that states possess
control over parental decisions when the child’s health, mental or physical,
is endangered.136 If states can intervene in the realm of parental authority
when parents endanger their own children, states should be able to
intervene by banning philosophical exemptions when parental decisions
endanger both their own children and other children. In the case of
vaccinations, when parents opt out of vaccinating their children, thereby
lowering vaccination rates and undermining herd immunity, they increase
the risk for all children to contract a preventable disease.137 Nevertheless,
other arguments exist in favor of philosophical exemptions.

128. Id. at 590–91, 602.
129. Id.
130. Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
131. Id.
132. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
133. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
134. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36–37.
135. Id. at 37–38.
136. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
137. See Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 265.
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2. Parents Opposed to Vaccinations Could Be Conscientious
Objectors
Although the parental due process argument seems likely to fail, a
potential second argument in favor of philosophical exemptions analogizes
these parents to conscientious objectors. In United States v. Seeger, the
Supreme Court held that although the pacifist belief in question was not
based on an “orthodox belief in God,” the belief was “sincere, honest, and
made in good faith.”138 Therefore, the Court extended the religious
exemption to mandatory military service to a group of young men who
objected to serving in the military.139 The Court stated that “any person
opposed to war on the basis of a sincere belief, which in his life fills the
same place as a belief in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist”
should receive an exemption.140
Parents who object to vaccinations on the grounds that vaccinations cause
autism could argue that their beliefs regarding the alleged link between
vaccines and autism are sincere and made in good faith, and therefore, the
Seeger definition of religion should apply to them. Although these beliefs
might be found to be sincere and made in good faith, they do not fill “the
same place as a belief in God.”141 The Seeger Court based its holding on
the fact that the beliefs qualified as religious exemptions,142 and objections
that rely on the correlations between vaccines and autism or other adverse
side effects are not based on beliefs akin to religion. The objections are
judgments regarding the effects of vaccinations, but not religious judgments.
The Court’s statement that beliefs of conscientious objectors cannot allow
them to avoid a “colliding duty fixed by a democratic government”143 bears
out that this argument should not succeed. In this situation, the conscientious
opposition would be objections to vaccinations on philosophical grounds, and
the colliding duty would be vaccination laws that aim to maintain high
vaccination rates for the public good.
B. Religious Exemptions
Although states are concerned with the public good of maintaining high
vaccination rates, they must also consider the public good of allowing citizens
to exercise religion freely. If religious exemptions are constitutionally
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166–67 (1965).
Id. at 164–65, 187–88.
Id. at 192–193 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 166–67, 187–88 (majority opinion).
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
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permissible, the inquiry then turns to whether religious exemptions are
constitutionally required.
1. The Constitutionality of Religious Exemptions
Regardless of whether religious exemptions are constitutionally required,
the Smith Court noted that religious exemptions are permissible.144 The
holdings in Jacobson and Zucht also support the conclusion that states are
permitted to enact religious exemptions to vaccination laws.145 If a state can
create mandatory vaccination laws under its police power,146 it should also be
able to create religious exemptions. Religious exemptions should be analyzed
under the Free Exercise Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Establishment
Clause to provide a complete analysis of the questions surrounding religious
exemptions and the state’s police power to enact them.
a. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Free Exercise Clause
The police power granted to the states does not extend so far as to allow
states to create any kind of religious exemptions they wish. Courts have
repeatedly struck down religious exemptions only for “bona fide members
of a recognized religion”147 or a “recognized church or denomination”148
because this language violates the Free Exercise Clause by infringing upon
the rights of adherents to nontraditional religions.149 One court held that the
refusal to recognize nontraditional religious beliefs under the state’s
religious exemption violated the Free Exercise Clause.150 Another court
granted religious exemptions to Jewish parents based on their personal
religious beliefs even though Judaism does not contain any objections to
vaccinations.151 These decisions suggest that if a religious exemption does
not favor some religions over others and specifically does not burden the
beliefs of nontraditional religions, the exemption would not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.
144. Emp’t. Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
145. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
146. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
147. Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp.
81, 84, 90–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
148. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942, 951 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
149. Id.; Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 84, 90–91.
150. Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 512–13, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
151. See Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655–56
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Additionally, although some courts have upheld vaccination laws that did
not allow religious exemptions,152 no court has held a religious exemption
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. One court declined to reach
the issue of whether the state’s interest might be pressing enough to intrude
on decisions not to vaccinate.153 Another court declined to reach the First
Amendment issues and simply relied upon “traditional child custody
analysis”154 in holding that the mother’s objection was based on religious
beliefs155—the court did not even question the constitutionality of the
religious exemption. Based on these decisions, states are permitted to enact
religious exemptions that do not infringe upon religious minorities’ rights
under the Free Exercise Clause.
b. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Due Process Clause
Similar to the jurisprudence generally in favor of allowing religious
exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, courts have readily accepted
the existence of religious exemptions under the Due Process Clause as
long as the exemption is not so narrowly tailored to exclude nontraditional
beliefs.156 Many other courts have heard cases that involve religious
exemptions, and regardless of whether the courts found that the belief was
in fact religious, they have either refused to comment on or have not
addressed the exemption’s constitutionality, thus leaving the exemption
intact.157 The Smith Court went so far as to refer to religious exemptions
as “desirable.”158 States are thus permitted to create religious exemptions
under the Due Process Clause.

152. See Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015);
Workman v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., No. 09-2352, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
5920, at *10–12 (4th Cir. Mar. 22, 2011); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d
945, 949–50 (W.D. Ark. 2002); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 112 n.8 (Md. 1982);
Wright v. De Witt Sch. Dist. No.1 of Ark. Cty, 385 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1965).
153. Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
154. Grzyb v. Grzyb, 79 Va. Cir. 93, 93 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009).
155. Id. at 97.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164–65, 187–88 (1965);
Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942, 951 (E.D. Ark. 2002); Lewis v.
Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 512–13, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Sherr v. Northport-East
Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 84, 90–91 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
157. See, e.g., Check v. New York City Dept. of Educ., No. 13-cv-791, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71124, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013); Lewis, 710 F. Supp. at
516–17; Hanzel, 625 F. Supp. at 1266; Diana H. v. Rubin, 171 P.3d 200, 205–06
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Grzyb, 79 Va. Cir. at 101–02.
158. Emp’t Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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c. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
In contrast to the jurisprudence generally in favor of allowing religious
exemptions under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses, one case
supports striking down religious exemptions to state vaccination laws on
Equal Protection grounds.159 In Brown v. Stone, the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the religious exemption to its vaccination laws was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.160 The court reasoned that the statute requiring mandatory
vaccinations for children “serves an overriding and compelling public
interest.”161 The court reasoned that allowing religious exemptions for
children with religious parents, who could claim an exemption based upon
religion, violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of children without
religious parents.162
Brown is unique, however, and does not have support—Mississippi is
the only state to adopt such a radical precedent.163 Without considering the
rights of parents to raise their children in the religion they wish, the Brown
court held that the statute mandating vaccinations was “complete in itself”
without providing religious exemptions and that the protection of
schoolchildren was a compelling state interest.164 The court failed to weigh
those competing interests and recognize that the statute’s narrow
exemption for religious beliefs furthered parents’ rights, particularly
religious rights, to raise their children in the religion they wish. This
approach contradicts that of many courts that have not even questioned the
constitutionality of a religious exemption under the Equal Protection
Clause.165 Consequently, Brown should not be followed, and courts should
rely on the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses precedents.

159. Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223–24 (Miss. 1979). The text of the
Equal Protection Clause reads, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
160. Brown, 378 So. 2d at 223–24.
161. Id. at 222.
162. Id. at 223–24.
163. Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Programs
Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 90–91 (2011).
164. Brown, 378 So. 2d at 223–24.
165. See Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543–44 (2d Cir. 2015);
Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F. Supp. 1259, 1265–66 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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d. Religious Exemptions Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause
Assuming that courts would rely on the precedents of the Free
Exercise and Due Process Clauses in allowing religious exemptions, states
must also consider how to define “religion” in exemptions under the
Establishment Clause, which provides that Congress cannot make a law
regarding the “establishment of religion.”166 One fiercely contested issue is
determining what beliefs are considered religions such that adherents are
eligible to receive exemptions to vaccinations. One court held that requiring
the religion to be a nationally recognized and established church did not
violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.167 The majority
view,168 however, is that such requirements violate the Establishment Clause
and that anyone who possesses a “sincerely held religious belief” opposed
to vaccinations, regardless of whether the religion is conventional, must be
allowed to opt out under the state’s exemption.169
In furtherance of this view, one commentator argues that the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test allows religious exemptions to vaccinations.170 Lemon sets
forth a three-part test to determine whether a law violates the Establishment
Clause.171 First, the purpose of the law must be secular.172 Second, the law’s
main effect must neither promote nor hinder religion.173 Finally, the law
must not have “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”174
This commentator argues that religious exemptions are allowed under the
Establishment Clause if two requirements are met: first, the exemption
must be neutral toward religions; and second, the relief that religious
freedom receives from the law must justify the subsequent burdens upon
those who do not benefit from the law.175
In addition to the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has articulated other
Establishment Clause tests. Another comes from Agostini v. Felton, in
166. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”).
167. Kleid v. Bd. of Educ., 406 F. Supp. 902, 904 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
168. Calandrillo, supra note 64, at 415.
169. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District,
672 F. Supp. 81, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
170. Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization
Statutes: Reaching for a More Optimal Balance Between Religious Freedom and
Public Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109, 126–28 (1997).
171. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
172. Id. at 612.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 613.
175. Aspinwall, supra note 170, at 127.
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which the Court stated three criteria for a law to avoid violating the
Establishment Clause:176 the law must not promote “indoctrination” by the
government; the law must not specifically name religions; and the law
must not be overly intertwined with religion.177 Under Cutter v.
Wilkinson,178 the law must be analyzed under the effects the exemption
might have on nonreligious citizens, the discrimination among religions,
and the chance of an exemption trumping other significant concerns.179
Provided that a religious exemption does not violate these tests, it is
constitutionally permissible.
2. Religious Exemptions Are Not Constitutionally Required
Because states are constitutionally permitted to establish religious
exemptions to their vaccination laws, the next inquiry is whether states are
constitutionally required to have religious exemptions. Similar to the
analysis of whether states are constitutionally permitted to have religious
exemptions, this inquiry also turns on the Free Exercise and Due Process
Clauses.
a. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Require Religious Exemptions
Although the Smith Court noted that states may create religious
exemptions to their laws and that the exemptions might even be
“desirable,” it added that these exemptions are not constitutionally
required and suggested the decision should be left to the discretion of state
legislatures.180 Dicta from another Supreme Court case, Prince v.
Massachusetts, suggests that religious exemptions might not be required
under the Free Exercise Clause.181 The Court rejected the argument that a
parent or guardian was free to violate child labor laws on religious grounds
under the Free Exercise Clause by enlisting the child to distribute religious
pamphlets.182 The case did not involve vaccination laws, but in dicta the
Court specifically highlighted religious objections to vaccinations, stating,
176. 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
177. Id.
178. 544 U.S. 709, 720–24 (2005).
179. Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses:
Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403,
431 (2007).
180. Emp’t Div. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
181. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (citing People v.
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201 (N.Y. 1903)).
182. Id. at 159, 164, 167–68, 171.
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“[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill
health or death.”183 The Court did not clarify whether it meant that parents
cannot claim religious exemptions when state law provides no exemptions,
or rather that religious exemptions are unconstitutional as a matter of
law.184 The Court did add, however, that although parents are free to
become “martyrs,” they cannot make the same decision for their young
children.185
Lower courts have employed similar reasoning, with one court stating
that parents’ freedom to exercise religion was “subject to a reasonable
regulation for the benefit of society as a whole.”186 Other courts have also
upheld vaccination laws that did not allow religious exemptions as
constitutional, reasoning that the lack of a religious exemption does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause.187 As recently as 2015, another court held
that mandatory vaccinations as a prerequisite for school attendance were
constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.188 Because courts have
ruled both that the presence of a religious exemption is constitutional and
that the absence of a religious exemption is constitutional, religious
exemptions are not constitutionally required under the Free Exercise
Clause.189 The inquiry then turns to the Due Process Clause.
b. The Due Process Clause Does Not Require Religious Exemptions
Some courts have rejected arguments that parents’ freedom to educate
and raise their children under the Due Process Clause includes the decision
to opt out of vaccinations. One court addressed this argument and held that
because Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder were related to children’s education and
not to parents’ refusals to vaccinate their children, the state could force
183. Id. at 166–67 (citing Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 170.
186. Wright v. De Witt Sch. Dist., 384 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1965).
187. See, e.g., Workman v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., No. 09-2352, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 5920, at *10–12 (4th Cir. Mar. 22, 2011); McCarthy v.
Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949–50 (W.D. Ark. 2002); Davis v. State, 451
A.2d 107, 112 n.8 (Md. 1982).
188. Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015).
189. This analysis could change under state religious freedom acts. If a state,
such as Louisiana, has enacted a religious freedom act, then it might be required
under state law to have a religious exemption. See States with Religious and
Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, supra note
14.
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parents to vaccinate their children.190 Other courts have reached similar
conclusions.191 Notwithstanding one anomalous decision under Smith and
Yoder that the state must defer to the parents’ wishes regarding how to
raise their children,192 the most reasonable conclusion is that states are not
constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause to have religious
exemptions to their vaccination laws.
C. Policy Considerations for Philosophical and Religious Exemptions
Constitutional considerations are not likely to be determinative in state
decisions to have philosophical or religious exemptions. An analysis of the
cases from the Supreme Court reveals that the Constitution requires neither
philosophical nor religious exemptions. Consequently, state decisions
regarding philosophical and religious exemptions must rely heavily upon
policy concerns, including the interest in deferring to parental decisions
balanced against the state’s interest in safeguarding public health. One
serious policy issue is that philosophical and religious exemptions combined
have the potential to destroy herd immunity. The discredited193
philosophical view that vaccinations cause autism has led to decreased
vaccination rates,194 which threatens herd immunity because it lowers the
number of vaccinated persons who serve as a barrier against disease
transmission.195 Additionally, states with lax requirements for proof to
obtain philosophical exemptions have higher rates of unvaccinated
children.196 The reason for these increased rates is that states often fail to
enforce the requirement that the beliefs be sincerely held or exercised in
good faith,197 which results in the purpose behind the creation of
philosophical exemptions being unfulfilled. Based on these facts, states
should not allow philosophical exemptions.
190. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 955 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
191. Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., No. 11-3431-cv, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21190, at *6–7 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2012); Workman, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
5920, at *15–17.
192. Diana H. v. Rubin, 171 P.3d 200, 205–06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
193. Wakefield, et al., supra note 82, at 639–40.
194. Chang, supra note 83 (finding that vaccination rates decreased by 2%
from 1999 to 2000 following publication of Wakefield’s article and continued to
decline in subsequent years).
195. Malone & Hinman, supra note 13, at 264–65.
196. Rota et al., supra note 70, at 647.
197. Hinman et al., supra note 81, at 125 (noting that 32 of 48 states that have
religious or philosophical exemptions have not denied even one application);
Hodge & Gostin, supra note 79, at 874.
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As philosophical exemptions can be abused, religious exemptions can
also be easily exploited. Parents often claim religious exemptions when
they are unable to obtain medical or philosophical exemptions.198 States
often grant religious exemptions without substantiating that the belief is
sincerely held and based upon religion, and they consequently grant
exemptions to nearly all parents who apply.199 Additionally, groups whose
objections are not actually based on religion form for the express purpose
of claiming religious exemptions.200 One report revealed that by mailing a
letter and making a donation to the “Congregation of Universal Wisdom,”
founded by chiropractors who believe that Western medicine is pagan and
satanic, parents can easily obtain a religious exemption.201
Serious policy considerations, however, are in favor of granting
religious exemptions. First, religious groups such as the Amish, who do
possess sincerely held religious beliefs against vaccinations, do not pose a
public health risk. They are geographically concentrated with a small
number of adherents202 and primarily expose only themselves to diseases
preventable by vaccines.203 Because these groups came to the United
States to practice their religion freely,204 religious exemptions would
accommodate their right to practice their religion. Consequently, good
policy favors allowing religious exemptions.
Second, the lack of a religious exemption interferes with all parents’
religious freedom and could lead to decisions that undermine parental
rights and autonomy. State intrusion in the raising of children can lead to
dangerous interference because the court, not the parents, would determine
the best interests of the child. A case exemplifying this danger is Painter
v. Bannister, wherein the court denied a father custody of his child for no
reason other than the court’s bias205 in favor of the child’s grandparents.206
The grandparents were educated and religious, whereas the child’s father
held no religious beliefs and had liberal political views.207 The problem with
198. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
199. Hinman et al., supra note 81, at 125 (noting that 32 of 48 states that have
religious or philosophical exemptions have not denied even one application);
Hodge & Gostin, supra note 79, at 874; McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
200. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
40 (2005).
206. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W. 2d 152, 153–55 (Iowa 1966).
207. Id.
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allowing courts to use this “best interests of the child” standard is that it
“necessarily invites the judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to
decide the case in whatever way the judge thinks best.”208 Legislatures
mandating vaccinations without religious exemptions is a similar egregious
intrusion because the legislatures would interfere with parents’ rights to
raise their children in their chosen religion under the Free Exercise Clause.
Finally, the Supreme Court recognized in Yoder that the right of parents
to raise their children in their religion is paramount under the Free Exercise
Clause.209 Additionally, the dissent in Prince v. Massachusetts stated that
the right of religious liberty was “too sacred” to be limited without proving
that the state’s interest was seriously jeopardized.210 Religious groups who
oppose vaccinations do not pose a serious threat to the public at large.211
Further, religious exemptions have been granted to parents with a religious
objection to vaccinations even when the parents’ religion does not formally
forbid vaccinations.212 Therefore, forcing vaccinations upon their children
would be a grave intrusion into their religious rights. Consequently, as a
policy matter, states should allow religious exemptions to their vaccination
laws.
IV. A TALE TOLD BY A COMPROMISE: THE CASE FOR BANNING
PHILOSOPHICAL EXEMPTIONS AND ALLOWING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
States face a difficult choice in deciding whether to allow both
religious and philosophical exemptions, whether to ban both, or whether
to allow only one or the other. On the one hand, private parental decisions
regarding how to raise children deserve to be honored. On the other hand,
the public interest in protection from diseases is also at stake. The issue of
exemptions to state vaccination laws thus presents states with a careful
balancing act because neither private nor public concerns should be
allowed to trample the other.
To solve the problem of exemptions to mandatory vaccination laws,
states should ban philosophical exemptions and allow religious exemptions.
California should retain CA SB277’s ban on philosophical exemptions but

208. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 205.
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
210. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
211. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
212. See Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655–56
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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should alter its law to allow religious exemptions, whereas Louisiana should
retain its religious exemptions but ban philosophical exemptions.213
Louisiana and California should ensure that religious exemptions are
not abused by requiring those who object to vaccinations to present proof
of their religious beliefs. One study found that requiring a high level of
proof in the form of notarized signatures reduced the number of
exemptions,214 and this requirement would help to ensure that the parents
claiming the exemption do in fact object on religious grounds. The law
should not attempt to differentiate among religions because such an
endeavor would lead to Free Exercise problems by burdening the beliefs
of adherents to nontraditional religions. The standard set forth in Seeger—
that of a “sincere belief, which in his life fills the same place as a belief in
God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist”215—should be used to avoid
granting exemptions to groups that claim to be religious but are simply
trying to avoid vaccinations on philosophical grounds. Louisiana and
California should adopt language similar to the following: “Exemptions
will be granted upon the showing of a sincerely held religious belief in the
form of a notarized letter.” This language would exclude philosophical
exemptions while avoiding First Amendment problems of favoring one
religion over another. Furthermore, the notarized letter serves a gatekeeping function to ensure that those citizens receiving the exemption
object on religious rather than philosophical grounds. Thus, the risk of
religious exemptions being abused by those who wish to claim
philosophical exemptions under the guise of religion would be
significantly reduced, if not eliminated, because philosophical exemptions
would not be tolerated in any form.

213. Louisiana might have an even higher interest in religious exemptions than does
California because of its Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, whereas California
does not possess an equivalent act. An interesting side note is that Mississippi has a
religious freedom act but does not allow philosophical or religious exemptions. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:5231 (2016); State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note
118; States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization
Requirements, supra note 14.
214. Rota et al., supra note 70, at 646–47.
215. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 192 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
See supra note 190 for a discussion of how state religious freedom acts might affect
whether they should have religious exemptions to vaccination laws.
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A. Philosophical Exemptions Should Be Banned
Philosophical exemptions should not be tolerated for two reasons. First,
parents can claim any reason they wish to receive an exemption. 216 This
standard is far too broad because it opens the door to illegitimate objections
that have no basis in science, such as refusing vaccinations because the parents
dislike the pharmaceutical industry. Second, the increase in unvaccinated
children because of the mistaken belief that vaccinations cause autism217 must
be halted to protect the population under herd immunity.
Several legal reasons in addition to policy considerations218 exist for
banning philosophical exemptions. First, the Supreme Court has already
addressed a parent’s worries over adverse effects of vaccines in Jacobson219
and declared that a minority view could not threaten public health.220 Second,
claims that parents are conscientious objectors should be rejected because
parents must comply with the “colliding duty” of the government in
maintaining high vaccination rates.221 Because states possess the power to
intervene when parents’ decisions endanger their own children,222 states
should intervene for the good of other children and the population in general.
B. Religious Exemptions Should Be Allowed
States should allow religious exemptions because of policy
considerations.223 States should follow the language of the Prince
dissent224 that called the freedom to practice religion a “sacred right” with
which the government should not interfere. States should also follow the
216. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 79, at 874.
217. Chang, supra note 83 (finding that vaccination rates decreased by 2%
from 1999 to 2000 following publication of Wakefield’s article and continued to
decline in subsequent years). A recent study using data from 2013 found that the
percentage of vaccinated children has dipped below the optimal rate of 90% for
the MMR vaccine—that is, the mumps, measles, and rubella vaccine—with 17
states reporting that fewer than 90% of children from the ages of 19 months to 39
months had not received the MMR vaccine. Measles Vaccination Rates for
Preschoolers Below 90 Percent in 17 States, supra note 62.
218. See supra Part III.C. for a full discussion of the policy arguments against
philosophical exemptions.
219. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 36–37 (1905).
220. Id. at 37–38.
221. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971).
222. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
223. See supra III.C. for a full discussion of the policy reasons in favor of
allowing religious exemptions.
224. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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language in Yoder recognizing parents’ rights to raise their children in the
religion they wish.225 In addition to these abstract considerations, religious
groups claiming religious exemptions to vaccinations are geographically
concentrated and small in number;226 therefore, their lack of vaccinations
is not likely to affect herd immunity. Although religious exemptions would
lead to a small percentage of the population being unvaccinated, a ban on
philosophical exemptions would ensure that vaccination rates do not dip
dangerously low.227 States should recognize religious exemptions even for
parents who are not part of a small, geographically concentrated religious
group because their beliefs are also religious in nature and deserve
recognition. Granting religious exemptions to these parents could threaten
herd immunity. Because most groups claiming religious exemptions are
small and geographically concentrated,228 however, this possibility is not
likely, and courts should not deny parents their religious rights based on this
remote prospect. Further, if states consider these children or those from a
small, geographically concentrated religious group who are unvaccinated to
be serious threats to public health, they have a solution readily available.
Delaware’s religious exemption states that if an outbreak of a vaccinepreventable disease occurs, or if in the opinion of the Division of Public
Health unvaccinated children have had or are at risk of exposure to a vaccinepreventable disease, those unvaccinated children will be temporarily barred
from attending public school until the Division of Public Health approves
otherwise.229 Concerned states should adopt similar provisions.
Turning to possible legal challenges to the proposed language—
“exemptions will be granted upon the showing of a sincerely held religious
belief in the form of a notarized letter”—under the Free Exercise Clause, this
language would survive a challenge of discrimination because it favors
religions equally. Courts have recognized religious exemptions even when
the parents’ formal religion does not forbid vaccinations and when the

225. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
226. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
227. Although the data regarding how many parents claim religious
exemptions versus philosophical exemptions is combined, which therefore makes
determining an exact number of parents claiming either exemption impossible,
this claim is reasonable because the report also notes that these groups are small
and geographically concentrated. Thus, concluding that most parents who claim
an exemption are claiming philosophical exemptions is reasonable. By banning
philosophical exemptions, the overall vaccination rate would likely rise. See
McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
228. Id.
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 131(a)(6)–(7) (West 2016).
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parents hold nontraditional religious beliefs.230 The proposed language
continues this precedent. Louisiana’s current religious exemption to
vaccinations would not face such a challenge because its requirement is “a
written dissent from the student or his parent or guardian.”231 Clearly, the
language does not discriminate among religions; it should simply be
modified to disallow philosophical exemptions and to require a notarized
letter.232
Addressing possible Establishment Clause challenges to the proposed
solution, the new language would not violate the Establishment Clause
under any Supreme Court test. Under one commentator’s argument, this
language would survive a challenge because it is neutral in its reference to
religions and because allowing groups to practice their religion as they
wish justifies the burden of slightly lowered vaccination rates.233 Religious
groups who opt out of vaccinations pose risks to themselves,234 and
banning philosophical exemptions would ensure that overall vaccination
rates remain high. Under the Agostini test,235 the proposed solution does
not indoctrinate its citizens; it poses no problem of identifying the
recipients by a named religion; and the exemption does not create
230. Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655–56 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 512–13, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:170 (2016).
232. Because of Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act,
Louisiana has a different test under the Free Exercise Clause; the Act explicitly
rejected the Smith test in favor of the Sherbert v. Verner test. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13:5232 (2016). The test provides that the state “may not substantially burden” the
exercise of religion even if the law is “facially neutral” or generally applicable.” LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5233 (2016). The only reason the state can impose such a burden
is if the application is both “[i]n furtherance of a compelling government interest”
and “[t]he least restrictive means of furthering that compelling that government
interest.” Id. Disallowing religious exemptions would qualify as a substantial
burden on parents who object to vaccinations for religious reasons. Mandating
vaccinations over religious objections is unlikely to qualify as a compelling
government interest in the vaccination context, despite the importance of herd
immunity. Imposing mandatory vaccinations would not be the least restrictive
means of furthering the state’s interest in herd immunity. Instead, the least
restrictive means would be banning philosophical exemptions so that combined,
philosophical and religious exemptors do not threaten herd immunity, because by
themselves, religious exemptors do not pose a threat. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
233. Aspinwall, supra note 170, at 126–28.
234. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
235. The test requires that the law does not promote “indoctrination” by the
government, that it does not specifically name religions, and that it is not overly
intertwined with religion. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).
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excessive governmental entanglement. Finally, under the Cutter test,236 the
solution would not burden nonreligious citizens because religious groups
threaten only themselves by refusing to vaccinate their children.237 No
possibility of sectarian discrimination exists, and the exemption would not
trump the other significant concern of maintaining herd immunity because
religious groups are small in number and geographically concentrated.238
States should grant religious exemptions even to parents who are not part of
a small, geographically concentrated religious group because their beliefs
are equally worthy of recognition. States concerned with the implications
for herd immunity as a result of granting these exemptions can adopt a
provision similar to Delaware’s limiting unvaccinated children from
attending school temporarily during a disease outbreak or if these children
are at risk of exposure to the disease.239 Finally, eliminating philosophical
exemptions while simultaneously tightening the requirements for religious
exemptions would ensure that overall vaccination rates remain high.
CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of maintaining high vaccination rates, states
have the police power to enact their own vaccination laws.240 Allowing both
philosophical and religious exemptions can create the risk of disease
outbreaks, which in turn can affect the rest of the population.241 States that
are lax in enforcing requirements for philosophical and religious exemptions
have the highest number of unvaccinated children.242 As CA SB277
demonstrates, however, banning religious exemptions infringes upon the
religious rights of groups who oppose vaccinations on religious grounds.243
Parents who object on philosophical grounds, such as the discredited link
between autism and vaccinations,244 pose the highest threat by raising the
236. The test requires that the law be analyzed under the effects the exemption
might have on nonreligious citizens, the discrimination among religions, and the
chance of an exemption trumping other significant concerns. Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 720–24; Carmella, supra note 179, at 431. See also supra Part
III.B.1.d.
237. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
238. Id.
239. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 14, § 131(a)(6)–(7) (West 2016).
240. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
241. Salmon et al., supra note 65, at 51.
242. Rota et al., supra note 70, at 647.
243. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
244. Wakefield, et al., supra note 82, at 639–40.
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number of unvaccinated children unchecked.245 Religious groups by
themselves do not pose a threat to herd immunity,246 and even those
parents who object on religious grounds but are not part of a
geographically concentrated group deserve recognition under religious
exemptions. Consequently, states should ban philosophical exemptions
and allow religious exemptions.

Megan Joy Rials

245. Chang, supra note 83 (finding that vaccination rates decreased by 2%
from 1999 to 2000 following publication of Wakefield’s article and continued to
decline in subsequent years).
246. McNeil, Jr., supra note 92.
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